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relationship continue to exist to the point that the wife can share in
his estate, although the personal relationship was terminated by an
ex parte divorce? Of course, if the wife can prove the invalidity of
the ex parte divorce then she remains his wife and will take her share
as his widow. 9 But assume the husband had left his wife in New
York and had gone to Nevada, where he got a valid ex parte divorce
and then died. Assume also that the wife has not sought support but
now seeks an indefeasible share in the estate. If New York grants it
to her, is it denying full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce? If
New York does not give it to her, it is failing to give effect to the
policy and rationale of divisible divorce?
Thus, since the first Williams case, the Supreme Court apparently
has been attempting to realign divorce law with the desires of society.
Such an undertaking, as has been indicated, gives rise to new and
complex problems, which must, in turn, someday be resolved by that
Court.
HARVEY CoucH, III

The Scope of the Depositor's Duty To Prevent and
Discover Alterations and Forgeries of His Checks
With billions of dollars worth of commercial paper changing hands
daily, the business world cannot afford uncertainty as to the duties of
the various parties to the paper, for uncertainty hinders negotiability.
This is especially true in the case of the relationship between the
drawer-depositor of a check and the drawee bank. Clearly the
drawee may not normally debit the drawer's account when it pays a
forged or materially altered instrument. However, when the drawer
carelessly executes a check or does not bother to examine his checks
when they are cancelled and returned to him, different considerations
arise, altering the general rule. Does the business world know what
these considerations are? Do drawers know what degree of care is
required of them when they launch checks onto the seas of commerce?
Perhaps not, and thus the reason for this note-to point out the problems in this area, note the solutions produced by the case law and
statutes, and suggest change where change perhaps is needed.
79. Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
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His BIGHT To RECOVER ON A
MATERIALLY ALTERED INSTRUMENT

I. DnxwER's CONDUCT AFFECTING

As a general rule the drawee bank which cashes a materially altered

check is absolutely liable to the drawer-depositor for the unauthorized

amount of the instrument, i.e., the amount the check was raised.1 This
is so because the bank is under a contractual duty, express or implied,
to pay only the amount authorized by the depositor. 2 However, an
early English case, Young v. Grote,3 held that this rule is not without
exception and that an innocent drawee bank may properly debit the
account of its depositor for the full amount of a check which is so
negligently drawn as to facilitate its subsequent alteration.4 The
precise nature of the decision, as well as the scope of the drawer's duty
to take care to prevent alterations, has been the subject of much
dispute.5
Most interpretations have placed denial of recovery by the drawer
on the basis of estoppel. Thus the drawer is "estopped" to set up the
material alteration as a defense against the bank. 6 This interpretation
is objectionable, however, because misrepresentation, an element of

true estoppel, is lackingJ In reality the legal responsibility of the
drawer is based essentially on his negligent conduct.8 But since the

suit by the drawer-depositor to recover funds paid out on a materially
altered (or forged) instrument is based on the contract of deposit, the
courts are reluctant to talk about negligence, even though they realize
that it is the depositor's negligence which provides the drawee bank a
1. BiwrroN, Bus AD NoTEs § 132, at 363 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as BrTTON]. The bank may of course debit the account of the depositor for the amount of
the check prior to the alteration. Smith v. State Bank, 54 Misc. 550, 104 N.Y.S. 750
(1907).
2. Ibid.
3. 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (1827).
4. Accord: Goldsmith v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 55 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1952); Timbl v.
Garfield Nat'l Bank, 121 App. Div. 870, 106 N.Y.S. 497 (1907); Foutch v. Alexandria
Bank & Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 149 S.W.2d 76 (1941). For a general discussion of
the doctrine see BRADY, BANK CHECKS § 14.6 (Bailey ed. 1962).
5. It has been stated that negligence did not enter into the case at all, that the
depositor by signing a blank check had given authority to any person in whose hands it
fell to fill it for any amount. This view is criticized in Note, 31 HARv. L. Rzv. 779, 780
(1918). Britton points out that Best, C. J., who decided the case, was most concerned
about the wisdom of entrusting a blank check to a female. Best concluded that this
conduct was certainly negligent. BarrroN § 282.
6. "'The grounds for the decision in Young v. Grote ... rests primarily on the doctrine of estoppel . .. "Preclusion from assertion of rights is estoppel." Ewart on Estoppel, 45."' Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 360, 149 S.W.2d
76, 80-81 (1941) (negligent drawer "estopped" to deny authority of drawee to honor
raised check). See also Goldsmith v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, supra note 4 (negligent
drawer "estopped" to set up defense of material alteration); BnrrroN § 282.
7. McCLINTocK, EQUITY § 31 (2d ed. 1948).
8. Note, 31 HAxv.L. REv. 779, 784-785 (1918). To say that negligence creates the
estoppel is to mean that negligence creates the liability. But see note 6 supra.
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defense, and not the bank's "justified reliance to its detriment" on
some misrepresentation of the depositor. Apparently the courts are
creating a new breed of estoppel based on negligent conduct rather
than misrepresentation. Unfortunately, such indiscriminate use of the
term leads to confusion.
In an effort to skirt the confusion resulting from this imprecise use
of the doctrine of estoppel, the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Law
[hereinafter cited as N.I.L.] 9 and the Uniform Commercial Code
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C. or the Code] 10 substitute "preclude" for

"estop." If the distinction between the terms were recognized by

the courts, much confusion would vanish. But courts continue to
insist that "preclude" and "estop" are synonymous," and judges continue to base decisions on the ground that the depositor's negligence
estops him from asserting the material alteration or forgery.
The principle of the Young case has been accepted by most American courts. However, Texas repudiated it12 on the theory that raising
the amount of a completed check constitutes a material alteration as
defined by N.I.L. section 125, which makes the rights of the parties
determinable by section 124, which in turn discharges the drawer to
the extent the check has been raised.' 3 Since section 124 does not

expressly recognize the Young doctrine, it has been interpreted as
indicative of an intent to abolish it. This position has been rejected
by the text writers 14 and the U.C.C.' 5 It has been correctly pointed
9. "When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose
signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative... unless the party, against whom
it is sought to enforce [the instrument] is precluded from setting up the forgery for
want of authority." N.I.L. § 23. Section 124 dealing with material alterations speaks
in terms of "authorization" and "assent" rather than preclusion.
10. "Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from
asserting the alteration or lack of authority .... ." U.C.C. § 3-406.
11. Union Trust Co. v. Soble, 192 Md. 427, 64 A.2d 744, 746 (1949); Coffin v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 392, 97 A.2d 857, 864 (1953).
12. Glassock v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393 (1924). Here a check
drawn in pencil by the depositor's son-in-law was altered from five to five hundred
dollars by the insertion of additional words in the spaces left in the check. The court
held that the depositor, even if he were negligent, could recover the unauthorized
amount from the bank. The court refused to hold the depositor responsible for the
intervening criminal act of a third party. The intervening criminal act was treated as
the cause of the loss. Although the N.I.L. was not in effect in Texas at the time this
case was decided, the court expressed the opinion that the result would be the same
under the N.I.L. It viewed the Young doctrine as being incompatible with § 124.
13. N.I.L. § 125 provides that: "Any alteration which changes . .. the sum payable
. . . is a material alteration." N.I.L. § 124 states: "Where a negotiable instrument is
materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except
as against a party who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration .... "
14. "The view that the N.I.L. makes inapplicable the principle of estoppel by negligence to actions on bills and notes cannot be supported, for all courts, which have
had occasion to pass upon it, have held in some types of cases that the principle is
just as applicable to cases under the act as before.... All courts agree that negligence

1204

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 16

out that the depositor's suit is not brought upon the check; rather it
is brought upon the contract of deposit between the bank and the
depositor.16 The N.I.L. is inapplicable in cases merely determining
rights and duties arising out of the contract of deposit. 17
Recognition of the rule of the Young case furthers the policy of
negotiability of commercial paper since it allows the bank, which
must determine the validity of large numbers of checks in a relatively
short period of time, cashing or dishonoring them at its peril, 8 the
assurance that the depositor by his negligence may not substantially increase the risks involved without suffering the consequences. On the
other hand, no onerous burden is placed on the drawer. All that is
required of him is the exercise of some care during a period when his
checks are peculiarly within his control and responsibility. Perhaps
most important is that the proposition for which Young stands is in
accord with the understanding of the business world. This is illustrated
by the express adoption of the doctrine in the U.C.C.'9
The drawer's negligence will not automatically relieve the bank of
its liability, however. In order to avail itself of the defense of preclusion based on the drawer's negligence, the bank must show that it
was not negligent itself in failing to detect the alteration.2 When
both parties are guilty of negligent conduct it may be said either that
the drawer's negligence is not a cause in fact, or that the bank's negligence in failing to detect the alteration at the time the check was
cashed is the proximate cause of the loss. Another explanation is
afforded by a re-examination of the positions of the bank and the
depositor. Initially the bank is under an absolute duty to pay only the
amount authorized by the depositor.21 Where the depositor's negligence is the proximate cause of the loss, equities arise in favor of the
bank which justify shifting the loss to the drawer. Where the depositor
and the bank are both negligent, however, the bank is in no better
position than the drawer; thus there is no compelling reason either to
by a drawer of a check in the examination of his canceled checks may result in the
loss of his right against the drawee bank . . . . In so far as the recognition of the
[Young] principle is concerned, there is no difference between negligent conduct prior
to or contemporaneous with the issuance of an instrument and negligence by the
drawer subsequent to issuance ... BrtON § 282, at 668-669.
15. U.C.C. § 3-406.
16. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTnumENTs LAW § 124, at 1192 (7th ed. Beutel 1948).
17. "The great interstate circulation of negotiable paper presents a good reason for
uniformity in the law of negotiable instruments but there is no such compelling reason
presented for uniformity in the law governing banker and depositor." Note, 23 Micu.
L. REv. 775, 778 (1925).
18. See 17 TENN. L. Rmv. 395 (1942).
19. U.C.C. § 3-406, comment 1.
20. Barrrox § 132, at 374.
21. Id. at 363.
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shift the loss or to make exception to the general rule that the bank is
liable.
Accepting the prevailing view that the depositor owes a duty to his
bank to exercise care in the execution of his checks, to what standard
of care must he conform to discharge this duty? The frequent characterization of the drawer as one of two innocent parties who made
the loss possible and therefore must bear it is not very helpful in
determining the precise nature of the drawer's duty.22 Just as meaningless is language which indicates that the drawer's conduct must
"invite" alteration rather than merely facilitate it.23 This terminology
may imply that something less than ordinary care will satisfy the
drawer's duty, and that only "gross negligence" will result in his
preclusion. This language is probably intended to emphasize the
causal connection which must exist between the drawer's negligence
and the method of alteration rather than to define the requisite degree
of care. One writer suggests that the drawer will be precluded only
when he is "exceptionally careless." 24 Obviously this conclusion depends upon the meaning of "exceptionally careless." The suggestion
is that while "exceptional carelessness" will defeat a drawer, the "ordinary careless" drawing habits of most people should not call for a
court to invoke the Young rule2
The key to the problem is this: these "ordinary careless" drawing
habits simply do not amount to negligence. To speak in terms of
exceptional carelessness is to run the risk of injecting the concept of
gross negligence into the controversy. This need not be. The standard
imposed on the drawer should be that of reasonable care under the
circumstances-the rule for determining the standard of care in any
negligence case. Since the question of negligence will almost always
be for the jury, whose natural sympathy will be with the drawer, few
drawers will be held to a very high degree of care in this situation,
and "ordinary careless" drawing habits will pass as reasonable. This
approach is better than trying to couch the depositor's duty in terms
of "slight care," a breach of which renders him liable because he has
been "grossly negligent."
22. Goldsmith v. Atlantic Natl Bank, supra note 4; Weiner v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.,
160 Pa. Super. 320, 51 A.2d 385 (1947); Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., supra

note 4.
23. Critten v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902); Foutch v.
Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., supra note 4.
24. "Even where the Young v. Grote rule is applied courts have narrowly limited
its scope to instances where blank spaces are unreasonably left on the lines where
the amount in words and figures is written and where the alteration consists of insertions
raising the amount. Thus the squeezing in of an insertion, as where the letter 'y' is
added after 'eight' so as to change 'eight' to 'eighty,' has been held not within the rule."
BRADY, BA-K CHncs § 14.6, at 454 (Bailey ed. 1962).
25. Id. at 458.
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The question of what conduct will constitute negligence on the
drawer's part is not easily answered. In the Young case the conduct
declared negligent was the entrusting by a depositor of signed, blank
checks to a person unskilled in business in order that she might carry
on the drawer's business in his absence.2 6 Courts have held that an
employer who entrusted signed blank checks to his employee, who
subsequently filled in the blanks for more than the authorized amount,
was negligent. 27 Leaving spaces in the instrument which can easily be
filled by an unscrupulous payee or a thief is the most common form of
negligence.2 Also, a depositor who could neither read nor write, but
who could distinguish figures, was precluded from asserting an alteration when it was shown that he had entrusted the writing of a check
to the payee who filled the check out for the correct amount in figures,
but for a larger amount in writing, and who subsequently raised the
figures to correspond to the writing.2 9 Finally, a depositor was held
negligent for writing on a check in pencil a condition which was erased
by the holder and cashed prior to the happening of the condition.30
This case has been criticized, however, for no other court has held a
drawer negligent simply because he wrote a check in mpencil.31 Neither
33
have the courts required the use of sensitized paper indelible ink,
"3 4 The
or some sort of check writing machine or ccprotectograph.
U.C.C. refuses to extend the drawer's duty any further in this direction.m
Not infrequently it has been suggested that the standard of care
required of the drawer should include a duty not to draw checks in
pencil. 36 A superficial objection to this is that the law recognizes the
validity of checks written in pencil just as it recognizes the validity of
those written in ink.37 However, the law also recognizes the validity
26. Young v. Grote, supra note 3.

27. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Cheese, Inc. v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 273 P.2d 547
(Cal. App. 1954), rev'd for bank's failure to show prejudice resulting from drawer's
negligence, 45 Cal. 2d 75, 286 P.2d 353 (1955).
28. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Atlantic Nat'1 Bank, supra note 4; Reiter v. Western State
Bank, 240 Minn. 484, 62 N.W.2d 344 (1953) and cases cited therein; Foutch v.
Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., supra note 4.
29. Weiner v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 142 Misc. 124, 253 N.Y. Supp. 203 (1931).
30. Harvey v. Smith, 55 Ill. 224 (1870).
31. Broad St. Bank v. Nat'l Bank, 183 N.C. 463, 112 S.E. 11 (1922); Lanier v.
Clarke, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 266, 113 S.W. 1093 (1910).
32. Savings Bank v. National Bank, 3 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1925).
33. Broad St. Bank v. National Bank, supra note 31. In both this and the Savings
Bank case, cited in note 32, the duty of taking the additional precautionary measures
was sought to be imposed on a bank. Obviously if courts will not hold banks to this
higher degree of care, they will not hold the average drawer to it.
34. Ibid.
35. U.C.C. § 3-406, comment 3.
36. See, e.g., Farmers' Bank v. Bank of Abbeville, 29 Ga. App. 472, 116 S.E. 204
(1923); Commercial Bank v. Arden, 177 Ky. 520, 197 S.W. 951 (1917).
37. Farmers' Bank v. Bank of Abbeville, supra note 36.
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of a check in which the most obvious spaces are left, but it imposes a
duty on the drawer not to leave such spaces in his checks, and requires
him to bear the resulting loss if his checks are altered.
A more serious objection is that of commercial inconvenience and
the possible extension of the rule to require more onerous precautionary measures.3 It is difficult to make a distinction between a check
written in pencil and one written in washable ink. A skillful alterer
could probably erase one as easily as the other, avoiding detection in
either case; and once the duty to use ink is established, it is not much
of an extension to require indelible ink; from there to sensitized paper,
and so on. The answer to the suggestion is this: Writing checks in
pencil is not negligence, for there is no pressing need to discourage
such practices. Witness thereto the facts that no bankers' organization
is clamoring for legislation or court action on the subject, and that
banks are not incorporating in their signature cards provisions to the
effect that they will not be responsible for losses resulting from the
alteration of checks written in pencil. The degree of care currently
required of the drawer seems to satisfy drawers, drawees, and courts
alike.
II. DRAwER-DEPosrro's CONDUCT PRIOR TO AND DURING
EXECUTION OF THE CHECK RESULTING IN His PRECLUSION
To ASSERT =HDEFENSE OF FORGERY

Just as it is possible for the drawer-depositor to preclude himself
from being able to assert the defense of material alteration to the
drawee bank's attempt to debit his account on an altered instrument,
it is possible for his carelessness prior to and at the time of execution
of the instrument to preclude him from claiming the defense of
forgery.3 9 Evidently the courts are less likely to find a depositor negligent in the case of forgery than they are in the case of material alteration. Nevertheless, the depositor does owe a duty to the drawee bank
to exercise some care to insure against both forged signatures and
forged endorsements.
One line of cases where the depositor's conduct precluded him from
38. Consider the position adopted by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code:
"No attempt is made to define negligence which will contribute to an alteration. The
question is left to the court or the jury upon the circumstances of the particular
cases ....
No unusual precautions are required and the section is not intended to
change decisions holding that the drawer of a bill is under no duty to use sensitized
paper, indelible ink, or a protectograph." U.C.C. § 3-406, comment 3. Although the
Code does not adopt a higher degree of care as a rule of law, it leaves within the
discretion of judges and juries the power to raise the requirement whenever a need is
felt.
39. BMrrON § 132. Forgery is used in the sense of any unauthorized signature.
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asserting a forgery is exemplified in Phillips v. A. W. Joy Co.40 There
the depositor left signed blank checks with his salesgirl for her to use
during the business day. The checks were stolen when they were left
out in the open while the depositor's office was vacant. Although
N.I.L. section 15 states that an incompleted instrument which has
not been delivered will not become valid if subsequently completed
and negotiated without authority, the court precluded the depositor
from asserting the forgery and negotiation of an undelivered, incomplete instrument because of the agent's negligence in leaving the
signed checks out in the open. Since the U.C.C. reverses the rule of
N.I.L. section 15,41 the depositor will be liable in states operating
under the Code also, but the grounds for liability will not be his
negligence or that of his agent.
Another line of cases precluding the depositor from asserting forgery
arises out of the situation where, because of inadequate safety precautions in the depositor's business arrangement, a dishonest employee
can make out checks to non-existent employees or in payment of nonexistent accounts, have the depositor or some other authorized person
sign the checks and return them to the forger, and by forging the
payees' names, cash them for his own use.4 This situation is not
covered by the "fictitious payee" rule of N.I.L. section 9(3), but it is
covered by the amendment to that section proposed by the American
Bankers' Association and adopted in twenty-four states. It is also
covered by the U.C.C.43 Under the fictitious payee rule, an instrument

is deemed payable to bearer, requiring no endorsement to negotiate,
if the named payee is intended to have no interest in it and the drawer
knows this. The A.B.A. amendment and the Code broaden the scope
of this rule to include an instrument made payable to a person not
intended to have any interest in it if this is known by the drawer, his
employee, or other agent. Thus the rule discussed in the above line
of cases will be applicable only in a state having neither the A.B.A.
amendment to section 9(3) nor the Uniform Commercial Code,
though the result will be the same.
To reach the decision that the depositor is precluded from asserting
the forgery of his employee, the court must conclude either (1) that
the depositor was negligent in relying implicitly on the honesty and
faithfulness of an employee whom he had no reason to suspect of dis40. 114 Me. 403, 96 At. 727 (1916).
41. U.C.C. § 3-407(3): "A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has
been completed, he may enforce it as completed."
42. Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of California, 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935);
see also Young v. Gretna Trust & Sav. Bank, 184 La. 872, 168 So. 85 (1936).
43. U.C.C. § 3-405. A number of states which adopted the Bankers' Association
amendment to N.I.L. § 9(3) have since adopted the Code.
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honesty, or (2) that the depositor was negligent in not setting up
business procedures with suflicient safety precautions to detect this
particular type of employee defalcation. The courts have specifically
rejected (1) as a grounds for negligence.44 The duty imposed on the
depositor is, therefore, to make some effort to verify the payee and
amounts of checks written at the request of his employees. 45
Two courts have precluded the depositor from asserting the defense
of forgery where the drawer mailed the check to a person other than
the payee, who had the same name as the payee and who forged the
endorsement knowing that he was not intended to have any interest
in the check. Although some courts confuse this problem with those
involving fictitious payees and delivery to imposters, 46 the correct basis
for denying the depositor the right to resist the debiting of his account
is that he, through his negligence in not ascertaining the correct address of the payee, greatly facilitated the forgery and made it practically impossible to detect. 47 Thus a drawer who mailed a check to
one Max Roth in Cleveland, thinking he was mailing it to a gentleman
of the same name in New York City, was precluded from asserting
the forgery when the Roth from Cleveland cashed in on his windfall.4
Similarly a drawer who drew a check payable to one Joe Cunningham
but mailed it49to a different Joe Cunningham was made to suffer the
resulting loss.
Finally, a minority of courts have precluded the depositor from
asserting the forgeries of his bookkeeper when the depositor retained
the bookkeeper in a position of confidence after he had become aware
that the bookkeeper had a record of unfaithfulness on prior jobs.59
The duty breached by the depositor was a duty not to keep an un44. See, e.g., Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Say. Bank, 252
Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185 (1930).
45. Gutfreund v. East River Nat'l Bank, 251 N.Y. 58, 167 N.E. 171 (1929). Here
the depositor's bookkeeper presented for signature checks to "Swift" (rather than
"Swift & Co.") attached to previously paid bills from Swift & Co. The depositor,
thinking the checks were in payment of the attached bills, would sign and
return them to the dishonest employee. The employee, whose duty it was to deliver
the checks to the payees, would add an initial to the payees' names so that the checks
would read "G. Swift," or "B. Swift," etc., forge the appropriate endorsements and
cash the checks for himself. The bank was allowed to debit the depositor's account for
the full amount of the checks on the grounds that the depositor was negligent in not
setting up a procedure to check on employees entrusted with check-paying duties of
this magnitude.
46. United States v. Union Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 819 (D.C. Md. 1956). This case
is complicated by the fact that the United States was both drawer and drawee of the
instrument but was suing on the guarantee of endorsements.
47. Weisberger Co. v. Barbertson Say. Bank, 84 Ohio St. 21, 95 N.E. 379 (1911).
48. ibid.
49. Citizens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W.2d 60 (1932).
50. Hillside Dairy Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 142 Ohio St. 507, 53 N.E.2d 499
(1944). But see note 52 infra.
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trustworthy employee in a position of trust.
In a host of other cases, however, the depositor has not been held
negligent in spite of his less than careful conduct. It has been held,
and appears to be the majority rule, that an employer who retains a
bookkeeper after having acquired knowledge of his activities as a
forger is not negligent in retaining the bookkeeper in a position of
trust.5 1 Likewise when a brother-in-law who was a convicted forger
living with the depositor used the opportunity to forge a number of
checks on the depositor's account, the drawee bank was not allowed
to debit the account on the ground that the depositor bad no duty to
keep his blank checks under lock and key in deference to his brotherin-law's record.5 2 These cases, however, appear clearly wrong.
The courts have also held that the mere practice of signing checks
with a rubber stamp is not negligence; but the depositor may be
under some duty to use care in keeping the rubber stamp out of improper hands. 53 Presumably if the depositor locks the stamp in his
safe only to have it stolen and a batch of bogus checks thereby forged,
the bank would suffer the loss since the depositor had taken precautions to keep the stamp in his possession. This type of case seems
subject to the same arguments that have been used against pencilwritten checks. That is, if the depositor wants the convenience of a
rubber stamp, he should be willing to suffer the loss which occurs
when a forger avails himself of the stamp to forge the depositor's
signature. Banks could protect themselves, however, by requiring a
depositor who wishes to use a signature stamp to agree to hold them
harmless in the event the stamp gets out of his possession.
Remembering the three exceptions mentioned above, it is safe to
say that the depositor will not be held negligent for failing to anticipate dishonesty on the part of his employees or other persons such as
friends and relatives who have regular opportunities to forge his paper.
Apparently the courts have adopted this position because they have
felt bound by the traditional agency rules concerning ratification and
estoppel. Unfortunately, strict adherence to these rules has in many
cases resulted in casting the loss caused by careless conduct of the
depositor onto a bank which acted diligently.
51. See, e.g., Home Indem. Co. v. State Bank, 23 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943);
Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938); Fitzgibbons Boiler Co.
v. National City Bank, 287 N.Y. 326, 39 N.E.2d 897 (1942).
52. Arnold v. State Bank & Trust Co., 218 N.C. 433, 11 S.E.2d 307 (1940).
53. First Nat'l Bank v. Albright, 111 Pa. Super. 394, 170 AUt. 370 (1934) (dictum).
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III. DEPOSITOR'S DUTY To INSPECT

FOR FORGED SIGNATURES AND

MATERIAL ALTERATIONS

We have seen that a depositor may be precluded from setting up
the defense of forgery, material alteration, or want of authority because of his negligent conduct prior to execution of the check. We
shall also see that he may be precluded for failing to discharge certain
duties after the cancelled checks are returned to him. What duty
does the depositor owe the drawee bank with regard to cancelled
checks? Basically it is the duty to examine them for forged signatures
and material alterations within a reasonable time after he receives
them,54 to compare them with his check stubs, 55 and to report any
discrepancies to the bank.es This duty may be said to arise as an
implied term of the contract of deposit to which the depositor assented
when he signed the signature card. 57 It is justified because the depositor is in a position to discover forged or altered checks and his prompt
report to the bank might enable the bank to recover the money
from the wrongdoer, or at least perfect its claim against a prior transferor, when recovery might otherwise be impossible. 58 The breach
of this duty either (1) creates an estoppel if the bank has relied on
the fact that the depositor would examine his accounts and report
discrepancies, and has been harmed by his failure to do so,59 or (2)
gives rise to a defense of breach of contract based on the depositor's
implied promise to use reasonable care in discovering and reporting
forgeries and alterations. 60 Since it is necessary that the bank be
harmed by the depositor's failure to inspect and notify, in the event the
bank is negligent in failing to detect an obviously forged or altered
instrument when one is presented to it for payment, it will not be able
54. Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886).
55. Ibid.
56. First Nat'l Bank v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893). But the depositor
is under no duty to call for his cancelled checks and if -the bank is harmed because
the depositor did not receive his vouchers for a long period of time, it has no grounds
for complaint. McCarty v. First Nat'l Bank, 204 Ala. 42, 85 So. 754 (1920).
57. Matteson v. Bank of Italy, 97 Cal. App. 643, 275 Pac. 998 (1929).

58. Remember that the rule of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762),
prevents the drawee bank from recovering money paid out on a forged signature unless

the person the bank paid was the forger or a bad faith purchaser from him.
59. Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Natel Bank, 166 Miss. 162, 146 So. 116

(1933). It should be noted that in this type of case a real estoppel in pais is created.
The depositor represents to the bank that everything is satisfactory when he reports
nothing to the contrary within a reasonable time after he has received his statement.
The bank relies on this representation when it makes no effort to recover money paid
out on checks covered by the statement, or continues to cash checks presented by the
wrongdoer or holders from him bearing forgeries or alterations which are not obvious.
The bank is harmed as a result of its reliance when it loses an opportunity to recover
these funds from the forger or continues to honor forged or altered paper.
60. Critten v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902).
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to claim either estoppel or negligence against the depositor.6 1 The
reasoning is that the bank could not have been harmed by the depositor's breach of duty because it should never have honored an obviously
faulty instrument in the first place.
Since negligent conduct creates the estoppel against the depositor,
the two defenses, estoppel and negligent breach of contract, are almost
coextensive. The defense based on estoppel is, however, available only
for those forged or altered checks which are honored after previously
forged or altered checks have been returned to the depositor for
verification. If the depositor fails to inspect the cancellations within
a reasonable time, and the bank subsequently honors more checks by
the same wrongdoer, the estoppel is created against the depositor. But
even though no estoppel can arise on the first forged or altered checks
which the bank honors, the depositor may still be precluded from
asserting his defense as to these checks because of his negligent conduct resulting in the breach of his implied contract that he will use
care in executing his checks. As a practical matter, however, proof
of injury in such a situation will be exceedingly difficult. The Code
62
makes both of these defenses available to the bank.
Critten v. Chemical National Bank 3 exemplifies the interplay of
considerations occurring whenever a bank ties to charge its depositor
with a forged or altered check. Critten employed one Davis whose
duty it was to draw checks on the company in payment of the company's bills, and enter the amounts and payees on the stubs of the
checkbook. Davis would present these with the bills for which they
were written to Critten to be signed. He was then supposed to mail
these checks to the proper payees. Over a two year period, however,
Davis purloined twenty-four of these checks, obliterated the names of
the payees and the amounts payable, raised the checks by about one
hundred dollars each, made them payable to cash, and cashed them.
He did not, however, change the amounts or the payees on the check
stubs. These checks were charged to Critten's account; the account
was balanced every two months; and the vouchers were returned to
Critten. But Davis himself was entrusted with the job of verifying
the bank balance. As a result, the scheme was not discovered for two
years.
The issue litigated when Critten sued to have his balance credited
by the amounts paid on the raised checks was that of Critten's negligence in not checking his cancellations. The court held Critten
chargeable with the information which would have been acquired by
an honest agent entrusted with the duty of inspecting the stubs. Cer61. Ibid.
62. U.C.C.§ 4-406(2).
63. Supranote 60.
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tainly the same result would have been reached had Critten himself
checked the vouchers and reported nothing to the bank, or simply
neglected to check the cancellations at all. Nevertheless, the bank was
allowed to debit Critten's account for only the third, fourth, and fifth
checks for these reasons: (1) As to the first two checks, Critten's
failure to report the alteration did not create an estoppel against him
because they were honored before Critten had an opportunity to
inspect. Neither could the bank prevail on a negligence theory because
it could not show that it would have been able to recover from the
alterer if Critten had been more prompt in notifying the bank of the
alteration. (2) The sixth check presented for payment by Davis was
obviously altered; therefore the bank itself was negligent in paying
it without question. Had it refused to pay and called the depositor's
attention to the alteration, the scheme would have been uncovered
then and the remaining eighteen checks would never have been
passed. Only as to the third, fourth, and fifth checks was the bank
injured by Critten's negligence in failing to report the first two alterations. Therefore, for these checks alone was Critten precluded from
asserting the alterations.
How much of an examination does the depositor have to make to
satisfy his duty to the bank? It is of little help to say he must examine
the vouchers in a way consistent with prevailing business standards.
What these are is for the jury to say. Of course his duty will necessitate an examination of the drawer's signature. 64 It should also include
a comparison of the amounts of the checks and the names of the payees
with those listed on the stubs. 65 One court held that the depositor fulfills his duty by examining only the cancellations if he has no stubs to
check them by and the forgery is too skillful to be detected without an
examination of stubs.66 In short, the depositor probably has no duty
to stub his checks, but if he does, he must include an examination of
the stubs in his search for forgeries and alterations. As was shown
above, the depositor does not have to make this examination himself.
He may delegate the duty to an employee, but he will be charged with
knowledge of what an honest employee would have discovered if the
67
employee making the examination does not report the wrongdoing.
IV. DE osrroR's DUTy To INSPECr FOR FORGED ENDORsEMENTS
It is universally recognized that the depositor has no duty to inspect
64. Morgan v. United Mortgage & Trust Co., 208 N.Y. 218, 101 N.E. 871 (1913).
65. Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424

(1923). The bank bad to bear the loss, however, because it had been negligent in not
discovering the forgery upon presentment of the check for payment.
66. Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, supra note 59.
67. Critten v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, supra note 60.
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his cancelled checks for forged endorsements.6 This is a recognition
of the probability that the depositor will not be familiar with the
payee's signature. For example, if the check is stolen by an agent of
the payee and cashed by forging the payee's endorsement, there is only

an infinitesimally small chance that the drawer could detect this by
examining the endorsements. But suppose the check is purloined by an
agent of the drawer. There is at least a possibility, because he might
be familiar with his agent's signature, that diligent inspection of the
endorsements would lead to a discovery of the agent's defalcation. For
this reason Professor Britton suggests that the depositor should be
under a duty to inspect for forged endorsements made by his own
agents.0 This rationale could certainly be extended to create a duty
for the depositor to inspect for forgeries by his wife, his children, his
business associates, or for that matter, anyone with whose signature
he should be familiar.
Notwithstanding the absence of a duty to investigate for forged
endorsements, if the depositor should happen to discover that a check
charged to him bears a forged endorsement, he is under a duty to report
this to the bank within a reasonable time. 0 Failure to do so will result
in his being precluded from asserting the forgery as a defense if the
bank is harmed by such failure.7 1 Here again, if the bank was negligent itself in paying an obviously forged instrument, or if the bank
was not prejudiced by the depositor's failure to discover the forgery,
it will not be aided by the defense of negligence.
V.

EFFECT OF PROVISION IN SIGNATURE CARD OR STATUTE ON DRAwER's
DuTY To GIVE NoTICE OF FORGED SIGNATURES, ENDORSEMENTS,
AND

ALTERATIONS

Suppose there is a provision in the signature card that the depositor
will report all errors to the bank within a specified time-for example,
ten days-after receiving the cancellations. One case held this would
bind the depositor if it were called to his attention and he assented to
it.7 2 Most courts have struck these provisions down, however, on a
68. See, e.g., Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E.
740 (1909); New York Cas. Co. v. Sazenski, 240 Minn. 202, 60 N.W.2d 368 (1953);
Sprague v. West Hudson County Trust Co., 92 N.J. Eq. 639, 114 Atl. 344 (1921).
69. BRarON § 143. This is quite similar to the problem talked about in the discussion dealing with depositor's negligence resulting in his employee's forging his paper.
There the duty imposed on the depositor was to discover defalcations before the checks
were negotiated; here the duty would be to discover employee forgeries after the cancellations are returned to the depositor.
70. National Sur. Co. v. President & Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y. 247, 169
N.E. 372 (1929).
71. Ibid.
72. Brunswick Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 214 Minn. 370, 8
N.W.2d 333 (1943).
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number of grounds. Primary among these are: (1) that the time for
discovery is too short to be fair to the depositor,7 3 and (2) that the
provision was not called to the depositor's attention."
At least forty states have statutory time limits within which notice
must be given if the depositor is to be able to assert the forgery or
alteration in his defense2 5 The U.C.C.'s provision is more or less
representative of other statutes although there is substantial variation
in them.7 6 The Code's provisions may be broken down thusly:
1. The depositor has a duty to use reasonable care in inspecting the
statement of account sent him by the bank for forgeries of his signature and alterations, and must notify the bank promptly upon discovering any error in the statement.7
2. If the bank establishes that the depositor failed in this duty and
it suffered loss thereby, the depositor is precluded from asserting the
forgery or alteration unless he can show the bank failed to use reasonable care in paying the item.78
3. Without regard to care or lack of care by either the depositor or
the bank, a depositor who does not notify the bank of an alteration or
forged signature within one year, or of a forged endorsement within
three years, of the time he receives his vouchers, is precluded from
asserting the forgery or alteration against the bank. 9
It should be apparent that the statutes imposing an absolute
time limit on giving notice do not free the depositor of his duty to
make a prompt inspection when he receives his cancellations. 0 The
statutory time limit simply establishes a cutoff point beyond which a
drawer cannot for any reason recover from the bank. It neither sets a
standard of reasonable care nor states what is a reasonable time
for giving notice. Thus if a forgery or alteration could have been
discovered by a reasonable inspection and wasn't, or if a defect
73. Frankini v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 86 P.2d 686 (Cal. App.
1939), subsequent opinion reported in 31 Cal. App. 2d 666, 88 P.2d 790 (1939).
74. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919);
First Nat'l Bank v. American Sur. Co., 77 Ga. App. 112, 30 S.E.2d 402 (1944); Detroit
Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County Home Say. Bank, supranote 46.
75. U.C.C. §4-406, comment 1.
76. U.C.C. § 4-406.
77. U.C.C. § 4-406(1).

78. U.C.C. §§ 4-406(2)-(3).
79. U.C.C. § 4-406(4). The section has another provision prohibiting the payor bank
from asserting a claim against a collecting bank or other prior party to the paper if it
has a valid defense against the depositor's claim and fails to assert it.
80. For cases construing state statutes on the same point see, e.g., McCormick v.
Rapid City Nat'l Bank, 67 S.D. 444, 293 N.W. 819, modified on rehearing on other
grounds, 67 S.D. 586, 297 N.W. 39 (1940); Denbigh v. First Nat'l Bank, 102 Wash.
546, 174 Pac. 475 (1918).
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was discovered but this fact was not related to the bank within a
reasonable time, the depositor will still suffer the loss if the bank was
prejudiced thereby, even though the depositor may have given notice
prior to the expiration of the statutory time limit. 81
VI. CONCLUSION
In redefining or expanding the duty of the drawer in light of contemporary changes in the concept of commercial due care, and in
interpreting the various statutes in this area, courts will do well to
remember that the basic consideration in their decisions must be the
promotion of certainty. For as was said in the opening paragraph,
uncertainty hinders negotiability, and in a nation dependent upon the
unlimited use of commercial paper to sustain its business activities, the
acceptance of this paper by those who are parties thereon, as well as
by those who are not, is imperative.
J. TimoTHY Win-=
81. Conceivably an argument could be made in states not having the Code that the

legislature by statute has stated that a "reasonable" time is six months or one year, or
whatever time is stated in the statute as being the time for giving notice; therefore, any
notice given within that time is reasonable even though the depositor may have discovered the wrongdoing much earlier.

